Authors
Lucas Rosenblatt
University of Buenos Aires
Abstract
Non‐classical logicians do not typically reject classically valid logical principles across the board. In fact, they sometimes suggest that their preferred logic recovers classical reasoning in most circumstances. This idea has come to be known in the literature as ‘classical recapture’. Recently, classical logicians have raised various doubts about it. The main problem is said to be that no rigorous explanation has been given of how is it exactly that classical logic can be recovered. The goal of the paper is to address this problem. First, I discuss a number of different ways to characterize the idea of classical recapture and I examine how far it can be pushed. Secondly, I argue that a palatable form of classical recapture is given by the thought that classical logic can be retained for statements that are grounded (in Kripke’s sense). To substantiate this view I provide a formal fixed‐point semantics for a language containing a predicate standing for the concept of groundedness and I address a couple of objections that have been deployed against the claim that classical recapture can aid the non‐classical logician’s cause.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12770
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,363
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The Logic of Paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Expressing Consistency Consistently.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):33-41.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Yes and No.I. Rumfitt - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):781-823.
What's So Logical About the “Logical” Axioms?J. H. Harris - 1982 - Studia Logica 41 (2-3):159 - 171.
"Philosophy of Logic" and the Work of Quine.Dobrin Spassov - 1974 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):86-99.
Confessions of a Meinongian Logician.Dale Jacquette - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 58 (1):151-180.
Relevance for the Classical Logician.Ethan Brauer - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (2):436-457.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-03-31

Total views
29 ( #374,768 of 2,445,458 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
29 ( #25,757 of 2,445,458 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes