Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):227-252 (1999)

Peter Ross
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
The problem of the nature of color is typically put in terms of the following question about the intentional content of visual experiences: what’s the nature of the property we attribute to physical objects in virtue of our visual experiences of color? This problem has proven to be tenacious largely because it’s not clear what the constraints are for an answer. With no clarity about constraints, the proposed solutions range widely, the most common dividing into subjectivist views which hold that attributed colors are mental properties or mental events} and a variety of realist views, which hold that colors are properties of physical objects. These realist views, in turn, divide into views that hold that attributed colors are dispositions of physical objects to produce color experiences (dispositionalism),° nondispositional relations between objects and perceivers (the relational view)," physical properties of physical objects (physicalism),‘ or sui generis properties of physical objects (primitivism and impressionism).‘ I’ll examine a proposed constraint which Mark Johnston (1992) calls Revelation. According to Revelation, the appearance of color in our ordinary visual experience provides us with unqualified access to the nature of color. While every proposal about the nature of color must take a stand on how the..
Keywords Appearance  Color  Epistemology  Experience  Nature  Perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00866.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,944
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick Milton Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
Locating Color: Further Thoughts.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):146-156.
Observational Concepts and Experience.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Warwick

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Projectivist Representationalism and Color.Wayne Wright - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.
Fitting Color Into the Physical World.Peter W. Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.
Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field.David M. Rosenthal - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.


Added to PP index

Total views
97 ( #118,897 of 2,498,161 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #212,239 of 2,498,161 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes