Two concepts of consciousness

Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59 (1986)
Authors
David Rosenthal
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way of looking at things, if any mental states do lack consciousness, they are exceptional cases that call for special explanation or qualification. Perhaps dispositional or cognitive states exist that are not conscious, but nonetheless count as mental states
Keywords Cartesianism  Consciousness  Epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/BF00355521
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On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Mindreading in Infancy.Peter Carruthers - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (2):141-172.

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