What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of emotions

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):544-563 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory of emotions.

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Author Profiles

Mauro Rossi
Université du Québec à Montréal
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal

Citations of this work

Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How Emotions Grasp Value.Antti Kauppinen - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):213-233.
Anger and its desires.Laura Silva - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):1115-1135.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Emotions.Nico Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.

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