Estudios de Filosofía 64:95-122 (2021)

Authors
Michael Barkasi
Rice University (PhD)
Melanie G. Rosen
Trent University
Abstract
The intuitive view that memories are characterized by a feeling of pastness, perceptions by a feeling of presence, while imagination lacks either faces challenges from two sides. Some researchers complain that the “feeling of pastness” is either unclear, irrelevant or isn’t a real feature. Others point out that there are cases of memory without the feeling of pastness, perception without presence, and other cross-cutting cases. Here we argue that the feeling of pastness is indeed a real, useful feature, and although this feeling does not define memory ontologically, it is a characteristic marker which helps us easily categorise a mental state first-personally. We outline several cognitive features that underlie this experience, including the feeling of past accessibility, ergonomic significance, immersion, objectivity and mental strength. Our account is distinctly phenomenal, rather than doxastic, although our web of beliefs may contribute to this experience.
Keywords fenomenología  imaginación  memoria  percepción
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.17533/udea.ef.n64a05
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,107
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Feeling the Past: Beyond Causal Content.Gerardo Viera - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía 64:173-188.
Existential Feelings: How Cinema Makes Us Feel Alive.Dina Mendonça - 2012 - Cinema: Journal of Philosophy and the Moving Image 3:211-228.
La fenomenología de la percepción en Spinoza.Zachary Hugo - 2018 - Revista de Filosofía 74:91-108.
The Failures of Functionalism.Sarah Robins - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía 64:201-222.
Two Visual Systems and the Feeling of Presence.Mohan Matthen - 2010 - In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. Oxford University Press. pp. 107.
Self-Referential Memory and Mental Time Travel.Jordi Fernández - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):283-300.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-08-03

Total views
9 ( #927,828 of 2,454,632 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #73,455 of 2,454,632 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes