Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6):44-62 (2018)

Authors
Melanie G. Rosen
Trent University
Abstract
Bodily experience in dreams should be considered illusory to the extent that they cannot be satisfactorily explained or fruitfully investigated by appealing to brain activity alone; rather, to wholly understand the unique phenomenology of embodied selfhood in dreams, one must understand how the brain processes real-body inputs to produce the phenomenology of embodied selfhood in dreams, and why the brain responds the way it does to external stimuli during sleep.
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