A plan-based causal decision theory

Analysis 82 (2):264-272 (2022)
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Abstract

In ‘An argument against causal decision theory’, Jack Spencer shows that standard formulations of causal decision theory run afoul of his Guaranteed Principle. In the sequential choice problem he employs to make this case, the transgression stems from an awkward discrepancy between how causalists typically value present vs future acts. This note suggests a version of causal decision theory that avoids this incongruity and so respects the Guaranteed Principle in Spencer’s problem. However, this formulation, and hence symmetric appraisal of present and future acts, is also shown to be insufficient to secure causalist satisfaction of the Guaranteed Principle in general.

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Gerard Joseph Rothfus
Universität Konstanz

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References found in this work

Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.

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