Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):133-164 (2022)

Authors
Hans Rott
Universität Regensburg
Abstract
This article explores conditionals expressing that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. A ‘relevantised’ version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. The idea of this test is that the antecedent is relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is accepted just in case the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and the consequent fails to be accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent’s negation. The connective thus defined violates almost all of the traditional principles of conditional logic, but it obeys an interesting logic of its own. The article also gives the logic of an alternative version, the ‘Dependent Ramsey Test,’ according to which a conditional is accepted just in case the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and the consequent is rejected if the belief state is revised by the antecedent’s negation. This conditional is closely related to David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis of causation.
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DOI 10.1017/s1755020319000674
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References found in this work BETA

Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Two Modellings for Theory Change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals.Nelson Goodman - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (5):113-128.

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Citations of this work BETA

Definable Conditionals.Eric Raidl - 2021 - Topoi 40 (1):87-105.
On the Logical Form of Concessive Conditionals.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (3):633-651.

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