Distinguishing Normative Reasons in Logins’ Erotetic Theory

Ethical Perspectives 30 (3):251-267 (2023)
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Abstract

We examine Logins’ (2022) erotetic view of normative reasons, specifically focusing on his distinction between normative reasoning reasons and normative explanatory reasons. A normative reasoning reason forms the content of a premise in reasoning or argument, while an explanatory reason is unsuitable for such a role. Logins considers this distinction to be robust and irreducible. Logins attempts to establish the distinction by appealing to specific examples where the roles diverge. We argue that these examples can be reinterpreted in a way that allows the same facts or propositions to fulfil both reasoning and explanatory roles. Furthermore, we contend that a case where a consideration is supposedly fit only for the explanatory role does not necessarily constitute a good explanation. Consequently, Logins’ strategy for establishing a ‘robust’ distinction between reasons may not be effective.

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Liva Rotkale
University of Latvia

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