Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):154-163 (1982)

Authors
Paul A. Roth
University of California, Santa Cruz
Abstract
The article argues, "contra" berger, that quine's advocacy alleged of classical logic is not based on any alleged "fit" between classical logic and some empirical account of language learning. roth begins by examining berger's claim that quine has changed his position on the acceptability of alternative logics. in berger's account, quine now accepts alternative logics because he could not defend his commitment to classical logic alone based on empirical evidence (e.g., verdict tables). roth argues that berger is mistaken both in thinking that quine has changed his position and in berger's belief that evidence regarding language learning is the basis of quine's view on logic. the actual basis, roth argues, is pragmatic
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.2307/2026071
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Two Kinds of Deviance.William H. Hanson - 1989 - History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):15-28.

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