Dialectica 34 (2):121-128 (1980)

Abstract
SummaryAfter presumably cleaning science of induction, Karl Popper claims to offer a purely noninductivist theory of science. In critically evaluating this theory, I focus on the allegedly noninductive character of this theory. First, I defend and expand Wesley Salmon's charge that Popper's dismissal of induction renders science useless for practical purposes. Without induction practitioners have no grounds for believing that the predicted event will actually take place. Second, despite Popper's demands to the contrary, his theory of science is shown to rest on induction. In particular, the function he attributes to background knowledge in testing a scientific hypothesis requires induction
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1980.tb00768.x
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References found in this work BETA

Objective Knowledge.Karl R. Popper - 1972 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
The Foundations of Scientific Inference.W. C. Salmon - 1966 - University of Pittsburgh Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowing and Guessing.Gerard Radnitzky - 1982 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 13 (1):110-121.

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