Journal of Philosophy 104 (2):71-106 (2007)

Authors
Daniel Rothschild
University College London
Abstract
This paper discusses the apparent scope ambiguities between definite descriptions and modal operators. I argue that we need the theory of presupposition to explain why these ambiguities are not always present, and that once that theory is in hand, Kripke’s modal argument loses much of its force.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2007104233
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Reference and Definite Descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Common Ground.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
Pragmatic Presuppositions.Robert Stalnaker - 1974 - In Context and Content. Oxford University Press. pp. 47--62.
Reference and Proper Names.Tyler Burge - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):425-439.

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Citations of this work BETA

Names Are Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59-117.
Descriptions as Predicates.Delia Graff Fara - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):59--117.
Type-Ambiguous Names.Anders J. Schoubye - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):715-767.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

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