Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78 (1992)
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Abstract |
A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant construction recipes for minimal changes of belief states. These relations, however, are required to satisfy rather demanding conditions. In the present paper we liberalize the concept of epistemic entrenchment by removing connectivity, minimality and maximality conditions. Correspondingly, we achieve a liberalization of the concept of rational belief change that does no longer presuppose the postulates of success and rational monotony. We show that the central results of Gärdenfors and Makinson are preserved in our more flexible setting. Moreover, the generalized concept of epistemic entrenchment turns out to be applicable also to relational and iterated belief changes.
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Keywords | Belief revision epistemic entrenchment theory change |
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DOI | 10.1007/bf00203386 |
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References found in this work BETA
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors & David Makinson - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):510-530.
Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics for Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):217-234.
Partition and Revision: The Semantics of Counterfactuals.Angelika Kratzer - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):201 - 216.
On the Logic of Theory Change: Safe Contraction.Carlos E. Alchourrón & David Makinson - 1985 - Studia Logica 44 (4):405 - 422.
View all 13 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Iterated Belief Change Based on Epistemic Entrenchment.Abhaya C. Nayak - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (3):353-390.
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery).Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
View all 30 citations / Add more citations
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