Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011)
Sometimes individuals act together, and sometimes each acts on his or her own. It's a distinction that often matters to us. Undertaking a difficult task collectively can be comforting, even if only for the solidarity it may engender. Or, to take a very different case, the realization (or delusion) that the many bits of rudeness one has been suffering of late are part of a concerted effort can be of significance in identifying what one is up against: the accumulation of grievances (no doubt well catalogued) is seen, not as an unfortunate coincidence of affronts stemming from various quarters, but as itself a product of a unified exercise of agency. A paranoid conspiracy theorist is not usually to be taken seriously. But he does get right that it certainly would be awful, for example, if everyone were out to get him and were working together to do so. After all, the stability and impact of agency that's shared can be expected to be more serious than the effects of a mere collection of individual acts.[1..
|Keywords||shared intention joint action collective intentionality|
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Citations of this work BETA
Social Cognition in the We-Mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
Response to Di Paolo Et Al.: How, Exactly, Does It ‘Just Happen’? Interaction by Magic.Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7):304-305.
The Logic of Group Decisions: Judgment Aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-15.
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