Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410 (2004)

Abe (Abraham) Roth
Ohio State University
My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become clearer once we understand what it is to act directly on one’s own intentions. But I take it to be a fundamental assumption of the prevailing individualism of the theory of action— one at the core of its conception of the separateness of individuals— that one person cannot act directly on another’s intention. I agree that there is an important way in which we are or can be separate and autonomous thinkers and agents. But the way the individualist tries to capture this separateness is misguided.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0031-8108
DOI 10.1215/00318108-113-3-359
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert H. Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention.Michael E. Bratman - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.
Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism.Seana Shiffrin - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):481-524.

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Agency and Omniscience.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.
Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Practical Intersubjectivity.Abraham Roth - 2003 - In F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics : The Nature of Social Reality. Rowman & Littlefield, 65-91. pp. 65-91.
Framing Joint Action.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):173-192.
Collective and Joint Intention.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.


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