Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (2):175-195 (1991)
This article explores and attempts to resolve some issues that arise when psychoanalytic explanations are construed as a type of historical or narrative explanation. The chief problem is this: If one rejects the claim of narratives to verisimilitude, this appears to divorce the notion of explanation from that of truth. The author examines, in particular, Donald Spence's attempt to deal with the relation of narrative explanations and truth. In his critique of Spence's distinction between narrative truth and historical truth, the author develops some suggestions regarding the role of truth in narrative explanations.
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The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.
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