Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science

Oxford University Press (2005)
Sherrilyn Roush defends a new theory of knowledge and evidence, based on the idea of "tracking" the truth, as the best approach to a wide range of questions about knowledge-related phenomena. The theory explains, for example, why scepticism is frustrating, why knowledge is power, and why better evidence makes you more likely to have knowledge. Tracking Truth provides a unification of the concepts of knowledge and evidence, and argues against traditional epistemological realist and anti-realist positions about scientific theories and for a piecemeal approach based on a criterion of evidence, a position Roush calls "real anti-realism." Epistemologists and philosophers of science will recognize this as a significant original contribution
Keywords Truth  Knowledge, Theory of  Evidence
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2005, 2006, 2007
Buy the book $8.41 new (95% off)   $28.79 used (45% off)   $52.00 direct from Amazon    Amazon page
Call number BD171.R72 2007
ISBN(s) 0199232938   0199274738   9780199274734   9780199232932
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,457
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.

View all 40 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Perceptual Knowledge Derailed.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45.
Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush.Eric Christian Barnes - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549-557.
Précis of Tracking Truth. [REVIEW]Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):213-222.
Recursive Tracking Versus Process Reliabilism. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):223-230.
Review: Review Article: Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush. [REVIEW]Eric Christian Barnes - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):549 - 557.


Added to PP index

Total downloads
77 ( #83,623 of 2,285,669 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #122,244 of 2,285,669 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature