Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):191-198 (2008)
In a recent contribution to Grazer Philosophische Studien, Booth argues that for S to have an epistemic reason to ψ means that if S ψ's then he will have more true beliefs and less false beliefs than if he does not ψ. After strengthening this external account in response to the objection that one can improve one's epistemic state in other fashions, e.g. by having a gain in true beliefs which outweighs one's gain in false beliefs, I provide a challenge to it. My main objection, which I advance with the aid of several examples, is that such epistemic reasons could not motivate any action whatsoever. I close by developing an alternative account, which avoids this problem by appeal to internal considerations.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
How to Change It: Modes of Engagement, Rationality, and Stance Voluntarism.Darrell P. Rowbottom & Otávio Bueno - 2010 - Synthese 178 (1):7-17.
Similar books and articles
The Essential Tie Between Knowing and Believing: A Causal Account of Knowledge and Epistemic Reasons.L. S. Carrier - 2011 - Edwin Mellen Press.
Internal Reasons and Practical Limits on Rational Deliberation.Carolyn Mason - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):163 – 177.
Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations.Steven L. Reynolds - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):19-35.
Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):447-462.
How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.
Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action?Anthony Robert Booth - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads107 ( #46,124 of 2,164,236 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #51,038 of 2,164,236 )
How can I increase my downloads?