Consciousness broadly construed

In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press (2010)
This chapter begins with a presentation of Frege’s reflections on the concept of sense and how it has been misread as leading to a philosophy based on psychologism. This is helpful because the focus of this chapter is based on the psychological—specifically, conscious experiences defined by there being something it is like to have them. An extended account of states that are both conscious and intentional is also discussed, claiming that the intentional directedness of experiences consists in disclosing activity, and that this disclosing activity typically involves neural processes, bodily processes, and things done in and to the world. This intentional directedness is used to argue the point for an extended model of conscious experience.
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0012
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