Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem

Philosophical Studies (6):1-20 (2014)
Abstract
According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the WKR problem can be dissolved. I argue that (A) the view that there are wrong kind of reasons for the pro-attitudes that figure in FA accounts conflicts with the conjunction of (B) an extremely plausible and extremely weak connection between normative and motivating rea- sons and (C) an extremely plausible generality constraint on the reasons for pro- attitudes that figure in FA accounts. I argue that when confronted with this trilemma we should give up (A) rather than (B) or (C) because there is a good explanation of why (A) seems so plausible but is in fact false, but there is no good explanation of why (B) and (C) seem so plausible but are in fact false.
Keywords Wrong Kind of Reason Problem  Buck-Passing Account of Value  Value  Reasons  Fitting-Attitude Accounts
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Reprint years 2015
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0359-z
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References found in this work BETA
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Not Quite Neo-Sentimentalism.Tristram Oliver-Skuse - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.

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