Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19 (2009)

Authors
Mark Rowlands
University of Miami
Abstract
According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM) , at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an adequate and properly motivated criterion—or mark—of the cognitive. Second, it provides such a criterion—one made up of four conditions that are sufficient for a process to count as cognitive.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515080802703620
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,491
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? [REVIEW]Kim Sterelny - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):465-481.

View all 51 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-03-08

Total views
333 ( #22,252 of 2,381,226 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #162,543 of 2,381,226 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes