Episteme 9 (4):377-391 (2012)

Authors
William D. Rowley
University of Rochester
Abstract
An objection to reductionism in the epistemology of testimony that is often repeated but rarely defended in detail is that there is not enough positive evidence to provide the non-testimonial, positive reasons reductionism requires. Thus, on pain of testimonial skepticism, reductionism must be rejected. Call this argument the ‘Not Enough Evidence Objection’. I will defend reductionism about testimonial evidence against the NEEO by arguing that we typically have non-testimonial positive reasons in the form of evidence about our testifier's evidence. With a higher-level evidence principle borrowed from recent work on the epistemology of disagreement, I argue that, granting some plausible assumptions about conversational norms, the NEEO is unsound.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONIAL REDUCTIONISMVolume 9, Issue 4William D. RowleyDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.25Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle email.@free.kindle.com@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONIAL REDUCTIONISMVolume 9, Issue 4William D. RowleyDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.25Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONIAL REDUCTIONISMVolume 9, Issue 4William D. RowleyDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2012.25Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission.
Keywords Epistemology  Testimony
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/epi.2012.25
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,634
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):234-237.
Evidence.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):315-335.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Knowing at Second Hand.Benjamin McMyler - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):511 – 540.
Accepting Testimony.By Matthew Weiner - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):256–264.
Hume on Testimony Revisited.Axel Gelfert - 2010 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 13:60-75.
The Informational Richness of Testimonial Contexts.Tim Kenyon - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):58-80.
Group Testimony.Deborah Tollefsen - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.
David Hume and the Probability of Miracles.George I. Mavrodes - 1998 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (3):167-182.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-10-03

Total views
61 ( #156,003 of 2,348,923 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #186,326 of 2,348,923 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes