Free will, moral responsibility, and the problem of OOMPH

The Journal of Ethics 10 (3):295-313 (2005)
Thomas Reid developed an important theory of freedom and moral responsibility resting on the concept of agent-causation, by which he meant the power of a rational agent to cause or not cause a volition resulting in an action. He held that this power is limited in that occasions occur when one's emotions or other forces may preclude its exercise. John Martin Fischer has raised an objection – the not enough ‘Oomph’ objection – against any incompatibilist account of freedom and moral responsibility. In this essay I argue that Fischer's not enough ‘Oomph’ objection fails to provide any reasons for rejecting Reid's incompatibilist, agent-causation account of freedom and moral responsibility
Keywords Compatibilism  Ethics  Free Will  Freedom  Moral Responsibility  Fischer, John Martin  Reid, Thomas
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Reprint years 2006, 2007
DOI 10.1007/s10892-005-5779-8
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