In Defence Of Popper On The Logical Possibility Of Universal Laws: A Reply To Contessa

Philosophical Writings 31 (1) (2006)
Abstract
This paper is a critique of Contessa’s . First, I show that Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery argues against the view that the logical probability of a hypothesis is identical to its degree of confirmation , rather than against Bayesianism. Second, I explain that his argument to this effect does not depend on the assumption that ‘the universe is infinite’. Third, and finally, I refine Popper’s case by developing an argument which requires only that some universal laws have a logical probability of zero relative to any finite evidence, and providing an example concerning Newtonian mechanics
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,141
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Intersubjective Corroboration.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Popper's Measure of Corroboration and P(H|B).Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs029.
A Brand New Type of Inductive Logic: Reply to Diderik Batens.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):248-252.
Popper on Laws and Counterfactuals.Danilo Šuster - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):109-119.
The Logical Status of Natural Laws.R. A. Sharpe - 1964 - Inquiry 7 (1-4):414-416.
Non-Inductive Explication of Two Inductive Intuitions.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):209-223.
On Logical Strength and Weakness.Chris Mortensen & Tim Burgess - 1989 - History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):47-51.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-12-22

Total downloads

64 ( #81,329 of 2,163,620 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #51,261 of 2,163,620 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums