Information Versus Knowledge in Confirmation Theory

Logique Et Analyse 226:137-149 (2012)
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Abstract

I argue that so-called 'background knowledge' in confirmation theory has little, if anything, to do with 'knowledge' in the sense of mainstream epistemology. I argue that it is better construed as 'background information', which need not be believed in, justified, or true.

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Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach.Karl Raimund Popper - 1972 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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