Information Versus Knowledge in Confirmation Theory

Logique Et Analyse 226:137-149 (2012)
Abstract
I argue that so-called 'background knowledge' in confirmation theory has little, if anything, to do with 'knowledge' in the sense of mainstream epistemology. I argue that it is better construed as 'background information', which need not be believed in, justified, or true.
Keywords Knowledge  Information  Confirmation  Evidence
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Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2):188-203.

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