Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):170-199 (2019)
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Abstract

Evolutionary debunking arguments in ethics aim to use facts about the evolutionary causes of ethical beliefs to undermine their justification. Global Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (GDAs) are arguments made in metaethics that aim to undermine the justification of all ethical beliefs. Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (LDAs) are arguments made in first-order normative ethics that aim to undermine the justification of only some of our ethical beliefs. Guy Kahane, Regina Rini, Folke Tersman, and Katia Vavova argue for skepticism about the possibility of LDAs. They argue that LDAs cannot be successful because they over-extend in a way that makes them self-undermining and yield a form of moral skepticism. In this paper I argue that this skepticism about the possibility of LDAs is misplaced.

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R. A. Rowland
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

A defence of the evolutionary debunking argument.Man Him Ip - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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