N-rays and the semantic view of scientific progress

Authors
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University
Abstract
This paper challenges a recent argument of Bird’s, which involves imagining that Réné Blondlot’s belief in N-rays was true, in favour of the view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge rather than truth. By considering several variants of Bird’s thought-experiment, it shows that the semantic account of progress cannot be so easily vanquished. A key possibility is that justification is only instrumental in, and not partly constitutive of, progress.
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2008.03.010
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References found in this work BETA

What is Scientific Progress?Alexander Bird - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):64–89.
Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
Why Do We Value Knowledge?Ward E. Jones - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):423 - 439.
Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper.Michael Clark - 1963 - (Repr. In Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series; Gendin and Hoffman, Eds., Introduction to Philosophy, 1973; Lucey, Ed., On Knowing and the Known, 1996; Huemer, Ed., The Epistemology Reader, 2002) Analysis 24 (2):46 - 48.
Truth as the Epistemic Goal.Marian David - 2001 - In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169.

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Citations of this work BETA

Scientific Progress: Four Accounts.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass:e12525.
Scientific Progress: Knowledge Versus Understanding.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:72-83.
Scientific Progress as Increasing Verisimilitude.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:73-77.
Scientific Progress Without Increasing Verisimilitude: In Response to Niiniluoto.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:100-104.

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