Authors
Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University
Abstract
Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. What I shall argue, rather, is that: (I) S does not provide a convincing argument that there really are such states; (II) S does not show, as he claims, that 'in-between states of belief' could not be accounted for in terms of degrees of belief; (III) S’s dispositional account of 'in-between states of belief' is more problematic than the 'degree of belief' alternative.
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References found in this work BETA

[Letter From Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.
A Treatise on Probability.Harry T. Costello - 1923 - Journal of Philosophy 20 (11):301-306.
Remembering Without Knowing.Sven Bernecker - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):137 – 156.
Belief.Renford Bambrough - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):78.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
Why ‘Believes’ is Not a Vague Predicate.Sophie Archer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3029-3048.

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