Socrates on Reason, Appetite and Passion: A Response to Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology [Book Review]

The Journal of Ethics 16 (3):305-324 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: a version in which on any given occasion desire, and then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; a version formed by the assimilation of to, labelled the ‘standard’ version’ by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, and treated by them as a single alternative to their own interpretation; and Brickhouse and Smith’s own version. Section 2 considers, in particular, Brickhouse and Smith’s handling of the ‘appetites and passions’, which is the most distinctive feature of interpretation. Section 3 discusses Brickhouse and Smith’s defence of ‘Socratic studies’ in its historical context, and assesses the contribution made by their distinctive interpretation of ‘the philosophy of Socrates’. One question raised in this section, and one that is clearly fundamental to the existence of ‘Socratic studies’, is how different Brickhouse and Smith’s Socrates turns out to be from Plato himself, i.e., the Plato of the post-‘Socratic’ dialogues; to which the answer offered is that on Brickhouse and Smith’s interpretation Socratic moral psychology becomes rather less distinguishable from its ‘Platonic’ counterpart—as that is currently understood—than it is on the interpretation they oppose

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,369

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reply to Rowe.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (3):325-338.
Reason and religion in Socratic philosophy.Nicholas D. Smith & Paul Woodruff (eds.) - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The philosophy of Socrates.Thomas C. Brickhouse - 2000 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Edited by Nicholas D. Smith.
The Paradox of Socratic Ignorance in Plato's Apology.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 1984 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (2):125 - 131.
Socrates’ Proposed Penalty in Plato’s Apology.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 1982 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 64 (1):1-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-26

Downloads
247 (#83,131)

6 months
15 (#172,692)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Rowe
Durham University

Citations of this work

Can Flogging Make Us Less Ignorant?Freya Möbus - 2023 - Ancient Philosophy 43 (1):51-68.
The role of practice and habituation in Socrates’ theory of ethical development.Mark E. Jonas - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (6):987-1005.
Reply to Rowe.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (3):325-338.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Plato and the art of philosophical writing.Christopher Rowe - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Socratic Moral Psychology.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 2010 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Nicholas D. Smith.

View all 21 references / Add more references