The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment

Analysis 78 (2):266-275 (2018)
Abstract
Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of. And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that holds.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx140
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References found in this work BETA
Higher-Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.

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