Analysis 78 (2):266-275 (2018)

R. A. Rowland
University of Leeds
Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of. And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that holds.
Keywords disagreement  moral disagreement  non-cognitivism  epistemology of disagreement  metaethics  expressivism  cognitivism
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx140
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
The Moral Problem.Michael Smith (ed.) - 1994 - Wiley.

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VI—Should We Believe Philosophical Claims on Testimony?Keith Allen - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):105-125.

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