The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment

Analysis 78 (2):266-275 (2018)

Authors
Richard Rowland
University of Reading (PhD)
Abstract
Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of. And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that holds.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/anx140
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 49,017
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

View all 57 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

VI—Should We Believe Philosophical Claims on Testimony?Keith Allen - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):105-125.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Dilemmas and Moral Realism.Nick Zangwill - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):71.
What is Wrong with Reid's Criticism of Hume on Moral Approbation?Laurent Jaffro - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):11-26.
Real-Life Moral Judgment.Gillian R. Wark - 1996 - Dissertation, Simon Fraser University (Canada)
What is Moral Judgment?Richmond Campbell - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-349.
Against Moral Intellectualism.Zed Adams - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (1):37-56.
Moral Judgment and Emotions.Kyle Swan - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3):375-381.
Moral Cognitivism Vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Belief Updating in Moral Dilemmas.Zachary Horne, Derek Powell & Joseph Spino - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):705-714.
Beyond Moral Judgment.Alice Crary - 2007 - Harvard University Press.
Against Moral Truths.Seungbae Park - 2012 - Cultura 9 (1):179-194.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-11-16

Total views
65 ( #139,592 of 2,310,935 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #518,033 of 2,310,935 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature