Analysis 78 (2):266-275 (2018)
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Abstract |
Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; it is intelligible to make moral judgments that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of. And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that holds.
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Keywords | disagreement moral disagreement non-cognitivism epistemology of disagreement metaethics expressivism cognitivism |
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DOI | 10.1093/analys/anx140 |
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References found in this work BETA
Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence.Marco Tiozzo - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1753-1766.
VI—Should We Believe Philosophical Claims on Testimony?Keith Allen - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (2):105-125.
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