The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument

Studia Logica 87 (1):65-71 (2007)
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Abstract

It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: probabilities reflect degrees of belief, degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that and are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur

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Darrell P. Rowbottom
Lingnan University

Citations of this work

Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
Intersubjective corroboration.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.

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