The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument
Studia Logica 87 (1):65-71 (2007)
Abstract
It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: probabilities reflect degrees of belief, degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that and are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occurAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2
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Citations of this work
Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism.Jon Williamson - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):67-85.
'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.
Intersubjective corroboration.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
References found in this work
Bayesian Nets and Causality: Philosophical and Computational Foundations.Jon Williamson - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Fair bets and inductive probabilities.John G. Kemeny - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):263-273.