The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Less attention, however, has been paid as to why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. Richard Rowland argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. He shows that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, uninformative, and at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. In addition, he extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties and concepts, such as fittingness and ought, in terms of reasons.

Similar books and articles

A very good reason to reject the buck-passing account.Alex Gregory - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.
What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
Reasons and value – in defence of the buck-passing account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
The buck-passing account of value: lessons from Crisp.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.
Reasons or Fittingness First?Richard Rowland - 2017 - Ethics 128 (1):212-229.
Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Francesco Orsi - 2006 - Philosophical Writings 32 (2):58-77.
Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?Ulrike Heuer - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.
Buck-passing and the wrong kind of reasons.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-04-15

Downloads
389 (#29,577)

6 months
52 (#26,239)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

R. A. Rowland
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Are all practical reasons based on value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17:27-53.
The fittingness of emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.
Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.R. A. Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.

Add more references