Why aren't duties rights?

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):175–192 (2006)
I do not answer my title’s question in this paper. Instead, my aims are first to show that the question is worth asking, secondly to show that its answer will not be trivial, and thirdly to show that it is unclear what the answer is. From these three conclusions it follows that many contemporary Hohfeldian approaches to the conceptual analysis of rights (including those of Sumner, Jones, Kramer, Wenar and myself)1, while potentially capable of extensional accuracy, overlook an essential but unidentified feature of rights: the feature which explains why duties are not rights. The paper challenges theorists to investigate what this feature is
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00436.x
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