What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird's Epistemic View
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):241-255 (2010)
| Authors | |
| Abstract |
This paper challenges Bird’s view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge, by arguing that unjustified scientific beliefs (and/or changes in belief) may nevertheless be progressive. It also argues that false beliefs may promote progress.
|
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| DOI | 10.1080/02698595.2010.522407 |
| Options |
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
Our Archive
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 34,507
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- commons.ln.edu.hk
(no proxy) - dx.doi.org (no proxy)
- works.bepress.com (no proxy)
- informaworld.com (no proxy)
- informaworld.com [2] (no proxy)
- tandfonline.com (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) - 1970 - Cambridge University Press.
View all 33 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Scientific Progress: Knowledge Versus Understanding.Finnur Dellsén - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:72-83.
Scientific Progress as Increasing Verisimilitude.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:73-77.
Scientific Progress Without Increasing Verisimilitude: In Response to Niiniluoto.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:100-104.
Progress as Approximation to the Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach.Gustavo Cevolani & Luca Tambolo - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):921-935.
View all 8 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
N-Rays and the Semantic View of Scientific Progress.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):277-278.
Scientific Progress as Accumulation of Knowledge: A Reply to Rowbottom.Alexander Bird - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):279-281.
The Role of Justification in the Ordinary Concept of Scientific Progress.Moti Mizrahi & Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):151-166.
What is Scientific Progress? Lessons From Scientific Practice.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (2):375-390.
Progress as Approximation to the Truth: A Defence of the Verisimilitudinarian Approach.Gustavo Cevolani & Luca Tambolo - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):921-935.
Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science: Piaget Vs. Kuhn on Scientific Progress.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2006 - Theory and Psychology 16 (2):203-224.
Progress as a Demarcation Criterion for the Sciences.Paul M. Quay - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (2):154-170.
Epistemic Progress: A Construct for Understanding and Evaluating Inquiry.Clinton Golding - 2012 - Educational Theory 62 (6):677-693.
Scientific Progress and Peircean Utopian Realism.Robert Almeder - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (3):253 - 280.
A New Understanding of the Technological Progress in the Modern Philosophy of Technology.Vitaly G. Gorokhov - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 48:25-31.
The Dynamics of Scientific Concepts: The Relevance of Epistemic Aims and Values.Ingo Brigandt - 2012 - In Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. Berlin: de Gruyter. pp. 75–103.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2010-10-07
Total downloads
204 ( #25,387 of 2,268,147 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #145,383 of 2,268,147 )
2010-10-07
Total downloads
204 ( #25,387 of 2,268,147 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #145,383 of 2,268,147 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads
