Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):1-20 (2007)
Abstract |
This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl is based on an autophenomenological conception of phenomenology, and, consequently, can be of no help to contemporary cognitive science; (4) however, heterophenomenology is indispensable for obtaining an adequate theory of consciousness. In response to Dennett’s analysis, the paper develops two main counterclaims: (1) Although the traditional conception of phenomenology does indeed fit Dennett’s notion of autophenomenology, his sceptical arguments fail to rule out at least the possibility of a modified version of this traditional conception, such as the one defended in Roy et al. (Naturalizing Phenomenology, 1999); (2) the distinction between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology is at any rate misconceived, because, upon closer analysis, heterophenomenology proves to include the essential characteristics of autophenomenology
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Keywords | heterophenomenology autophenomenology skepticism Dennett Husserl |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11097-006-9030-2 |
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References found in this work BETA
Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson~ - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
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Citations of this work BETA
Heterophenomenology Reconsidered.Daniel C. Dennett - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):247-270.
The Mind's Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science.Ronald de Sousa - 2010 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
Phenomenological Skepticism Reconsidered: A Husserlian Answer to Dennett’s Challenge.Jaakko Belt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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