Synthese (5):4523-4541 (2019)

Authors
Olivier Roy
Universität Bayreuth
Anne Schwenkenbecher
Murdoch University
Abstract
We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know and believe about what the others intend, know, and believe. We propose an alternative, pooled knowledge, and argue that it allows formulating conditions on shared intentions that meet the two desiderata.
Keywords shared intentions  pooled knowledge  common knowledge  collective action  Michael Bratman  shared agency
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Reprint years 2019
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02355-x
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