Philosophy of Science 35 (2):134-155 (1968)

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Rozeboom Rozeboom
University of Alberta
Abstract
When Hempel's "paradox of confirmation" is developed within the confines of conditional probability theory, it becomes apparent that two seemingly equivalent generalities ("laws") can have exactly the same class of observational refuters even when their respective classes of confirming observations are importantly distinct. Generalities which have the inductive supports we commonsensically construe them to have, however, must incorporate quasi-logical operators or connectives which cannot be defined truth-functionally. The origins and applications of these "modalic" concepts appear to be intimately linked with a number of basic conundrums in the philosophy of science, such as causation and the nature of explanation
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DOI 10.1086/288198
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