The Achilles Argument and the Nature of Matter in the Clarke-Collins Correspondenc

In Tom Lennon & Robert Stainton (eds.), The Achilles of Rational Psychology (2008)
The Clarke-Collins correspondence was widely read and frequently printed during the 18th century. Its central topic is the question whether matter can think, or be conscious. Samuel Clarke defends the immateriality of the subject of the mental against Anthony Collins’ materialism. This paper examines important assumptions about the nature of body that play a role in their debate. Clarke argued that consciousness requires an “individual being”, an entity with some sort of significant unity as its subject. They agree that body does not have this type of unity, because it consists of actually distinct parts.
Keywords mind-body problem  body  Achilles Argumnet  unity of consciousness  Samuel Clarke  Anthony Collins  simplicity of the soul
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Katherine Brading (2013). Three Principles of Unity in Newton. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):408-415.

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