The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:73-80 (1999)
The Causal Theory of Action (CTA) is the view that x is person p’s token action if x is a movement of p’s body caused in the right way by p’s mental states which rationalise x. But there seem to be many actions which are part of a ‘larger’ action, like some particular movement executed in shaving, which are preceded by nosuch rationalising mental states. To cover these cases, the amended CTA says that some item x is a person p’s action if either the above account is true of x or x is part of a whole such that the above account is true of the whole. I discuss various senses of ‘part’ which might make the amended account plausible and conclude that the account is overly permissive; it will count as actions many items which clearly are not actions
|Keywords||Conference Proceedings Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Actions and Their Parts.David-Hillel Ruben - 1999 - In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. pp. 73-80.
Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons.Rebekah L. H. Rice - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
The Intentionality of Intention and Action.John R. Searle - 1979 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
Naturalizing Action Theory.Bence Nanay - 2014 - In Mark Sprevak & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave.
Mental Overpopulation and Mental Action: Protecting Intentions From Mental Birth Control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-65.
At One with Our Actions, but at Two with Our Bodies.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.
Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads25 ( #204,025 of 2,172,020 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #325,967 of 2,172,020 )
How can I increase my downloads?