Constantes lógicas y la armonía de las reglas de inferencia

Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 9:103-119 (2017)
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All through the literatura, the question about what is a logical constant has recieved many answers, from model-theoretic aproaches,, to answers that focus in the inferential practice as meaning,,. Detractors of the second tradition presented many ineludible incovenients, in particular, the logical constant named ‘tonk’. Inferentialist tryed many solutions, in particular they presented the concept of ‘harmony’. The goal of this paper is to show that the different criteria of ‘harmony’ used in the proof-theoretic semantics to determine what is and what is not a logical constant fail to be necessary or sufficient. I will show the philosophical reasons that make this concept appear and then i will describe the different ways in wich the literatura understads the concept of ‘harmony’. Then I will show that they subgenerate or overgenerate connectives with some counterexamples. Finaly, I will explain some philosophical reasons that should delimitate where to go towards a satisfactory definition of ‘harmony’.



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References found in this work

The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Natural deduction: a proof-theoretical study.Dag Prawitz - 1965 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
What are logical notions?Alfred Tarski - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (122):47-67.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):419-425.

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