Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (forthcoming)
AbstractErik Wielenberg  and Mark Murphy ,  have defended a series of arguments for the conclusion that creatures are not good intrinsically. In response, I take two steps. First, I introduce a conception of intrinsic value that makes created intrinsic value unproblematic. Second, I respond to their arguments in turn. The first argument is from the sovereignty-aseity intuition and an analysis of intrinsicality that makes derivative good extrinsic. I challenge the analysis. The second comes from a conception of perfection where God exhausts all possibilities for goodness. I challenge this conception. The third comes from the contingency of creation and the internal logic of intrinsic value. I challenge the assumption that connects the two. I then present an argument from reference magnetism that the only conception of God, God's perfections, and religious language that makes it plausible that the sentence "God is intrinsically good and creatures are not" is true involves a strongly univocalist position. A view that is either unstatable or places strong demands on our conception of God, God's perfections and religious language thereby loses plausibility.
Similar books and articles
Created Goodness and the Goodness of God: Divine Ideas and the Possibility of Creaturely Value.Dan Kemp - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (3):534-546.
“Love is also a lover of life”:creatio ex nihiloand creaturely goodness.John Webster - 2013 - Modern Theology 29 (2):156-171.
Does the Failure of Utilitarianism Justify a Belief in Intrinsic Value?: Ross’ and Moore's Default Arguments.Imtiaz Moosa - 2002 - Philo 5 (2):123-142.
Divine Satisficing and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil.Chris Tucker - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (1):32-56.
Pleasure and Intrinsic Goodness.Earl Brink Conee - 1980 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Is Creation Really Good?: Bonaventure’s Position.O. Ilia Delio - 2009 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):3-22.
Audi on the Rationality of Altruism.Charlott Becker, Raphael Heger, Johannes Müller-Salo, Konstantin Schnieder & Bernadette Schwabe - 2018 - In Johannes Müller-Salo (ed.), Robert Audi: Critical Engagements. Springer Verlag. pp. 121-139.
Neither 'Good' in Terms of 'Better' nor 'Better' in Terms of 'Good'.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):466-473.
Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.
The Concept of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil.G. Stanley Kane - 1975 - Religious Studies 11 (1):49 - 71.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.