Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):12-38 (2015)

Abstract
This article explores the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and epistemic permissiveness. If the suggestion that all epistemic notions are interest-relative is viable , then it seems that a certain species of epistemic permissivism must be viable as well. For, if all epistemic notions are interest relative then, sometimes, parties in paradigmatic cases of shared evidence can be maximally rational in forming competing basic doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition. However, I argue that this total pragmatic encroachment is not tenable, and, thus, epistemic permissivism cannot be vindicated in this way
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12060
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.
Credal Pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.
The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.
Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-13.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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