Attitudes as nonentities

Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203 (1994)
materialist that beliefs are not immaterial soul-states, I think that the conception of beliefs as brain states is badly misguided. I hope to show that "beliefs are brain states or soul states" is a false dichotomy. I am using the phrase 'beliefs as brain states' to cover several familiar theses: the token-identity thesis, according to which beliefs are identical to brain-state tokens; nonreductive materialism, according to which beliefs are constituted by brain states (as pebbles are constituted by..
Keywords Attitude  Belief  Cartesianism  Causation  Epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/BF00989824
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