Metaphysics and mental causation

In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-96 (1993)
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Abstract

My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality consists of a network of events.1 The second concerns the nature of causation, and the third concerns the conception of behavior. I try to vindicate a robust idea of mental causation

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Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Anti-reductionist Interventionism.Reuben Stern & Benjamin Eva - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):241-267.
Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mental Causation.David Robb & John Heil - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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