Tandf: Inquiry:1-28 (forthcoming)

Authors
Fernando Rudy-Hiller
National Autonomous University of Mexico
Abstract
In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by focusing on what I call ‘expectations-generating social factors’ such as social practices, cultural scripts, social roles, socially available self-conceptions, and political and legal institutions. I then bring my account to bear on the debate about the exculpatory potential of moral ignorance. I show that a prominent position in this debate – the position that denies that moral ignorance exculpates – is grounded on an individualistic and acontextualist conception of moral capacities, moral cognition, and blameworthiness, and that this conception leads those philosophers who endorse it to make a number of questionable claims regarding the ability of ordinary agents to overcome their moral ignorance and the culpability they bear for the latter. I conclude by indicating how my socially situated account addresses the issue of moral ignorance.
Keywords capacities  social context  moral ignorance  fair opportunity  blame
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2019.1667871
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Instrumentalism About Moral Responsibility Revisited.Anneli Jefferson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):555-573.
Nobody’s Perfect: Moral Responsibility in Negligence.Ori Herstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 31 (1):109-125.
Kantian Group Agency.Amy MacArthur - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):917-927.
Two Ways of Socialising Responsibility: Circumstantialist and Scaffolded-Responsiveness.Jules Holroyd - 2018 - In Katrina Hutchinson, Catriona Mackenzie & Marina Oshana (eds.), Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: pp. 137-162.
Why Value Values?Murray Samuel - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
Nonhuman Animals Are Morally Responsible.Asia Ferrin - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):135-154.
Agency as Difference-Making: Causal Foundations of Moral Responsibility.Johannes Himmelreich - 2015 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science
Evil, Ignorance, and the 9/11 Terrorists.Todd Calder - 2004 - Social Philosophy Today 20:53-66.
Evil, Ignorance, and the 9/11 Terrorists.Todd Calder - 2004 - Social Philosophy Today 20:53-66.
A Neo‐Stoic Approach to Epistemic Agency.Sarah Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):262-275.
Holding Others Responsible.Coleen Macnamara - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-09-19

Total views
136 ( #79,239 of 2,454,402 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #84,210 of 2,454,402 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes