Inquiry 48 (5):413-435 (2005)
This paper starts from the debate between proponents of a neo-Lockean psychological continuity view of personal identity, and defenders of the idea that we are simple mental substances. Each party has valid criticisms of the other; the impasse in the debate is traced to the Lockean assumption that substance is only externally related to its attributes. This suggests the possibility that we could develop a better account of mental substance if we thought of it as having an internal relation to its states. I suggest that we may be able to do this by relying on the notion of expression. In developing this idea I draw heavily on aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology, while also developing and criticizing Strawson's account of persons and recent work by Lynne Baker. I conclude by arguing that mental substance, understood in this way, can only be grasped in narrative terms; substantialist and narrative accounts of personal identity, far from being opposed, are mutually supporting and require one another to be coherent
|Keywords||Consciousness Expression Metaphysics Mind Narrative Baker, Lynne Rudder Strawson, Peter Frederick|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Apologia Pro Vita-Fabula Sua: Defending Narrativity and How We Make Sense of Our Lives.Melvin Chen - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):251-268.
Is Narrative Identity Four-Dimensionalist?Patrick Stokes - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):e86-e106.
Locke, Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Personal Identity.Patrick Stokes - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):645 – 672.
Getting the Story Right: A Reductionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2014 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-25.
Crossing the Bridge: The First-Person and Time.Patrick Stokes - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):295-312.
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