Mind 61 (241):82-84 (1952)

IN a recent article Dr. Paul D. Wienpahl proposes an explication for Frege's notion of sense that, he believes, "fits the data of Frege's discussion and does not make sense a subsistent entity" (p. 483). Wienpahl's proposal is that "the sense of a sign is the combination of its physical properties" (p. 488). But in the face of the requirements which he has set himself, there seem to be three considerations which lead to the conclusion that his proposal is defective.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/lxi.241.82
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