Paranoia and reinforced dogmatism: Beyond critical rationality

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):339-350 (2003)
Abstract
Deviant forms of human thought may provide insight into epistemic standards, such as rationality. A comparative analysis of paranoia and reinforced dogmatism suggests that reinforced dogmatism, such as pseudo-science a-la-Popper, demonstrates a primary epistemic lack of critical rationality, that is, of testability, whereas paranoia demonstrates a lack of range of alternative statements leading secondarily to a lack of testability. This reflects the importance to both epistemology and psychiatry of epistemic standards in addition to testability, such as relevance to problems, and emphasizes the distinction of the context of introduction from the contexts of discovery and of justification. Key Words: context of introduction • paranoia • reinforced dogmatism • relevance • testability.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0048393103252781
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,150
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Relativism, Dogmatism, and Rationality.David R. Hiley - 1979 - International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):133-149.
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Altruism is a Form of Self-Control.Howard Rachlin - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):284-291.
Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism.Adam Leite - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Testability and Candor.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - Synthese 145 (2):233 - 275.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

17 ( #278,335 of 2,152,226 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #281,219 of 2,152,226 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums