Paranoia and reinforced dogmatism: Beyond critical rationality

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):339-350 (2003)

Deviant forms of human thought may provide insight into epistemic standards, such as rationality. A comparative analysis of paranoia and reinforced dogmatism suggests that reinforced dogmatism, such as pseudo-science a-la-Popper, demonstrates a primary epistemic lack of critical rationality, that is, of testability, whereas paranoia demonstrates a lack of range of alternative statements leading secondarily to a lack of testability. This reflects the importance to both epistemology and psychiatry of epistemic standards in addition to testability, such as relevance to problems, and emphasizes the distinction of the context of introduction from the contexts of discovery and of justification. Key Words: context of introduction • paranoia • reinforced dogmatism • relevance • testability.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0048393103252781
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,711
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57):377-379.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl R. Popper - 1960 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Goldman - 1986 - Mind 96 (382):273-278.
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science.Stephen Stich - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):261-278.

View all 22 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Relativism, Dogmatism, and Rationality.David R. Hiley - 1979 - International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):133-149.
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (1):61-75.
Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism.Adam Leite - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
Altruism is a Form of Self-Control.Howard Rachlin - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):284-291.
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Testability and Candor.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - Synthese 145 (2):233 - 275.


Added to PP index

Total views
27 ( #284,374 of 2,328,173 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #725,336 of 2,328,173 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature