Paranoia and reinforced dogmatism: Beyond critical rationality

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (3):339-350 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Deviant forms of human thought may provide insight into epistemic standards, such as rationality. A comparative analysis of paranoia and reinforced dogmatism suggests that reinforced dogmatism, such as pseudo-science a-la-Popper, demonstrates a primary epistemic lack of critical rationality, that is, of testability, whereas paranoia demonstrates a lack of range of alternative statements leading secondarily to a lack of testability. This reflects the importance to both epistemology and psychiatry of epistemic standards in addition to testability, such as relevance to problems, and emphasizes the distinction of the context of introduction from the contexts of discovery and of justification. Key Words: context of introduction • paranoia • reinforced dogmatism • relevance • testability.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,873

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Relativism, Dogmatism, and Rationality.David R. Hiley - 1979 - International Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):133-149.
Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Altruism is a form of self-control.Howard Rachlin - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):284-291.
Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism.Adam Leite - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 158–179.
Testability and candor.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - Synthese 145 (2):233 - 275.


Added to PP

55 (#297,262)

6 months
8 (#411,508)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 44 references / Add more references