Mind 94 (376):526-537 (1985)
Plato's "theaetetus" (187-200) raises puzzles about false belief. Frege's explanation of how an identity statement can be informative is often seen as a solution to socrates' puzzles. The strategy of frege's solution is to explain a "mistake" as a "mismatch". But it turns out that socrates' argument, In fact, Is aware of and rejects this strategy
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Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the "Sophist".Scott Berman - 1996 - Apeiron 29 (1):19-46.
Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the Sophist.Scott Herman - 1996 - Apeiron 29 (1):19-46.
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