American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348 (1998)
Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For example, recently Ned Block commented
|Keywords||Epistemology Naturalism Person Phenomena Sentence|
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Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists.Kristie Miller - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):567-593.
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